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TECHNOLOGY SHIFTS AND THE LAW:
YEAR 2000 READINESS FOR BANKS AND THRIFTS
PATRICIA A. McCoY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of new technology is not a static event; rather, it is the
beginning of a dynamic process in which old tradeoffs are renegotiated and
incompatible standards vie for dominance. Thus, in the railroad industry, the
South eventually scrapped narrow-gauge for standard-gauge tracks in the
nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, the beta videocassette format
was eventually replaced by VHS, computer operating systems evolved
toward Windows and blood banks refined their procedures to screen for
AIDS.
As this suggests, old generations of technology continually evolve
into new generations of technology in order to accommodate change.
Sometimes this is to achieve uniformity in standards (as with railroads,
VCRs and personal computers) or greater power or speed (as with computer
chips). Other times, it is to address risks of imminent harm (as with blood
banks and AIDS).
When change is driven by uniform standards or technological
improvements, generally the owners of the old technology have the choice of
bearing the cost or doing without. But where imminent harm necessitates
change, should the law redress potential harm to third parties from a failure
to replace the old technology and, if so, how? The law could take a number
of stances. First, the law could force owners (or the original manufacturers
of the technology) ex ante to install the new technology at their own expense.
Second, the law could refrain from intervening ex ante, making replacement
a voluntary matter, but require the owners (or the manufacturers) to
compensate any harm to third parties ex post. Finally, the law could decline
to intervene and let the losses lie where they fall.
The "Year 2000 problem" and the specter of massive computer
breakdowns raised these problems with uncommon urgency. As is well
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known by now, the Year 2000 problem arose from the inability of hardware
and software based on older operating systems to recognize dates after
December 31, 1999.' In the final analysis, the century date change passed
uneventfully and predictions of an apocalyptic breakdown proved
unfounded. Pundits later debated whether the enormous efforts to repair the
Year 2000 bug were a success or a waste of funds, a question that may never
be answered with certainty. The only thing that can be said with any
assurance is that the feared damage did not come to pass.
This article chronicles the regime of ex ante government regulation
that was imposed on the United States banking industry to prevent the Year
2000 problem from materializing. For most industries in the United States,
Year 2000 compliance was a voluntary matter and allocation of the risk of
harm was left to private contracting and any ex post remedies that the legal
system might afford. In the financial services industries, however,
particularly in securities and banking, there was a different state of affairs.
In those industries, the government adopted an intricate system of command-
and-control regulation that mandated Year 2000 repairs and compliance
through regulatory decrees and examinations, on pain of closure.
Why did financial services undergo a stricter regime of government
intervention in comparison with other industries? Ultimately, concerns about
financial contagion and systemic risk were the factors that proved decisive.
Banks are the glue that binds the payments system and, as such, banks are
inextricably linked through electronic funds transfers and correspondent
accounts. Due to that interconnectivity, Year 2000 problems at one major
bank could have easily spread to others, raising fears about paralysis of the
payments system and a halt to general commerce.
The concerns about systemic risk were compounded by the fact that
banks were peculiarly vulnerable to breakdowns from the Year 2000
problem. More than in other industries, the overwhelming proportion of
what banks did - from interest rate calculations to loan amortization
schedules - required date-sensitive calculations. Thus, on average, ninety
percent of a bank's computer operations were "mission critical" in the sense
that they were vulnerable to the Year 2000 bug and posed major risk to the
institution if any of those operations failed.2  Furthermore, the computer
systems of banks and thrifts were in constant telecommunication with
outside computer systems of correspondent banks, automated clearinghouses,
etc. That made the banking industry prone to reinfection by outside
computer systems if their customers and business partners were not Year
I See Section II infra.
2 See David Greaves, Note and Comment, Banks and the Year 2000 Problem, 2
N.C. BANKING INST. 390, 396 (1998).
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2000 compliant. Compounding matters, smaller institutions were more
likely to depend on outside software vendors whose repair efforts were
outside of their control.3
The deadline for fixing the Year 2000 problem was uniquely
immovable. In a prodigious feat of agency mobilization, federal banking
regulators prodded the banking industry - through the bully pulpit,
regulations and agency sanctions - to repair the Year 2000 problems in their
computer systems. It increasingly became apparent, moreover, that the Year
2000 problem was not just a technological problem. It affected every aspect
of a bank's business, from computer specialists to accountants, from the
boardroom to the lowliest teller.
This article surveys the guidelines and guidances that were issued by
federal banking regulators on Year 2000 compliance up through the spring of
1999.4 The effect of those standards on mergers, acquisitions and other
regulatory applications is described*5 In addition, the article discusses the
SEC's 1998 interpretive release on the requirements for Year 2000-related
disclosures under the federal securities laws.6  The article closes with
consideration of supervisory actions by federal banking regulators
concerning Year 2000 compliance, ranging from agency examinations to
enforcement.
H. THE PROBLEM
The Year 2000 problem referred to the inability of computer
hardware and software that were based on older operating systems to
recognize dates after December 31, 1999. The problem posed systemic
safety concerns for the banking industry due to the industry's heavy reliance
on date-sensitive computer calculations.
The Year 2000 problem dated back to the decision by computer
programmers in the 1960s to economize on computer memory by coding
years between 1900 and 1999 by their last two digits. Thirty to forty years
ago, personal computers had not arrived and mainframe computer memory
was scarce and prohibitively expensive. Costs could be cut if six bytes of
memory were used to designate a date, say by coding April 1, 1968 as
680401 instead of 04/01/1968. Thus, the decision was made to sacrifice the
ability to recognize dates before or after the twentieth century for savings in
3 See id. at 399.
4 See Section III infra.
5 See Section IV.A infra.
6 See Section IV.B infra.
7 See Section V infra.
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memory. As a consequence, software that was imbedded with the old two-
digit codes was programmed to assume that dates after December 31, 1999
were dates in the 1900s or even stop functioning altogether 8
In the 1960s, with the twenty-first century years off and
technological advances occurring at breakneck speed, numerous software
designers assumed that operating systems and other software they designed
would be discarded long before the millennium arrived, forestalling a Year
2000 problem. Their predictions proved wrong. Later operating systems and
software upgrades were grafted onto the original 1960s software, thereby
incorporating and perpetuating the old two-digit codes. As the Year 2000
eventually drew near, many businesses were shocked to find that their date-
sensitive systems were prone to miscalculation or failure, despite major
investments in new software systems. 9
The Year 2000 problem (also known as Y2K, the century date
change or the millennium bug) was of acute concern to banks and bank
regulators. Most bank information systems today are highly computerized.
By its very nature, moreover, the banking business requires myriad date-
sensitive computations. Consider, for example, interest calculations, posting
of debits and credits, payment notices, verification of credit card expiration
dates, and preauthorized electronic payment orders, not to mention reports to
regulators. If Year 2000 problems were not corrected, interest payments
could have been calculated as of the early 1900s. Loans could have appeared
as a century overdue. Paid-up insurance policies could have been canceled
as expired. Amortization schedules could have been miscalculated. Expired
credit cards could have been reactivated and valid ATM cards could have
been denied authorization. Panicky depositors could have triggered a New
8 See, e.g., Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), The
Effect of Year 2000 on Computer Systems (visited June 1996) <http://www.ffec.govl
y2k/sr96J6.htm>; Robert G. Gerber, Computers and the Year 2000: Are You
Ready?, 30 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 837, 839-41 (1997); Timothy E. Keehan &
Brad L. Peterson, The Year 2000 Problem: Managing your Bank's Relationships-A
US. Perspective, 12 J. INT'L BANKING L. 482, 482 (1997). Where software used an
eight digit date field, it was not safe to assume that the institution's systems were
Year 2000 ready. Complete testing was necessary to verify that there were no
century date change problems. See FFIEC, Questions and Answers Concerning
FFIEC Year 2000 Policy (visited Aug. 31, 1998)
<http://www.ffiec.gov/y2k/y2kq&a.htm> [hereinafter Questions and Answers].
9 See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 8, at 841, 843-44.
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Year's Eve run on deposits. At worst, vital links in the payment system
could have broken down, causing bank payments to grind to a halt.'0
There were essentially two solutions to the Year 2000 bug, both of
which were straightforward from a programming perspective but costly and
time-consuming. One solution was to examine the computer software for
every depository institution to detect and correct the two-digit date codes.
That necessitated hiring programmers (often trained in Fortran and COBOL
in the 1960s and 1970s) at a cost of $1 or more per line, to sift through
billions of lines of code. The other solution was to throw out a bank's old
software entirely and install a whole new system, often with new hardware,
that was Year-2000 compliant." In some cases, lack of funds necessitated
short-term repairs, followed by outright replacement after January 1, 2000*2
Either way, the solution was staggeringly expensive and the cost
kept rising with time. As January 1, 2000 approached, trained programmers
were in ever-increasing demand and their fees continued to mount. Total
outlays by the banking industry for Year 2000 readiness were expected to
exceed $10 billion and may have topped half a billion dollars apiece for the
largest U.S. banks.'
3
The overwhelming proportion of banks and thrifts fixed their internal
Year 2000 problems.' 4 However, the problem was not self-contained.
Repairing the bank's software was not enough. By necessity, virtually every
depository institution exchanged data over computer lines with other
institutions, customers and regulators. Any incoming data from the outside
that was infected with the Year 2000 problem could reinfect the computer
system of the bank. Banks could lose revenue due to reduced deposits and
loan defaults if unprepared corporate customers suffered business
'0 See, e.g., Gary E. Clayton et al., The Year 2000 Headache "Two Thousand
Zero-Zero. Party's Over. Oops, Out of Time. ", 28 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 753, 755-57
(1997); Keehan & Peterson, supra note 8, at 482-83.
" See, e.g., Keehan & Peterson, supra note 8, at 482-83.
12 See FFIEC, Year 2000 Project Management Awareness (visited May 5, 1997)
<http://www.ffiec.gov/y2k/advisory2.htm> [hereinafter Project Management
Awareness].
13 See, e.g., R. Christian Bruce, OCC Cuts a CD for National Banks To Help
Assess Year 2000 Preparations, 71 BNA BANKING REP. 908, 909 (1998); Eileen
Canning, Year 2000: Bankers Will Spend More Than Expected on Y2K Compliance
Efforts, Officials Say, 71 BNA BANKING REP. 827 (1998); Greaves, supra note 2, at
390.
14 The accounting firm Grant Thomton LLP reported, for example, that 98 percent
of 815 community banks surveyed were confident that their repairs would be in
place when 2000 arrived. See Community Banks Sure About Y2K Readiness; Less
Confident About Customers, Study Says, 72 BNA BANKING REP. 331 (1999).
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interruptions or failures due to Year 2000 computer problems of their own.
Extra cash had to be on hand to meet demand for funds by worried
depositors. Finally, banks faced service interruptions if the operations of
their outside vendors shut down due to internal Year 2000 problems. These
problems were compounded when dealing with businesses located abroad,
where Year 2000 readiness was even further behind. Because banks had to
rely on the Year 2000 readiness of outside firms, the preparedness of the
business community at large was the weak link in the chain and one that was
not fully within banks' control. 5
11. FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR FIXING THE YEAR 2000
PROBLEM
Beginning in 1997, federal banking regulators issued a series of
guidances and guidelines designed to ensure that banks and thrifts attained
Year 2000 readiness. The Year 2000 remediation process was divided into
six stages, consisting of awareness, assessment, repairs, testing,
implementation and contingency planning.
Determined to avoid a meltdown of the nation's banking system,
federal banking regulators, along with the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC), prodded banks and thrifts since 1996 to
become Year 2000 compliant. Pressure from federal regulators stepped up
after it became apparent in 1997 that large segments of the banking system
were oblivious to the impending Year 2000 glitch. Two years later, there
was a remarkable turnaround and the banking industry was among the most
prepared of all American industries. The Year 2000 compliance efforts of
federal banking regulators were a remarkable story of agency mobilization
and resolve in the face of an immovable and potentially catastrophic
deadline.
FFIEC first issued a call for action on the century date change in an
interagency statement titled "The Effect of Year 2000 on Computer
Systems" in June 1996. Initially, federal regulators issued safety and
soundness standards for Year 2000 compliance in the form of a series of
guidance papers published under the auspices of FFIEC.' 6 The first eight
1" See id.
16 See FFIEC, Year 2000 Customer Communication Outline (1999)
<http:\\www.ffiec.gov\custcom.htm>; FFIEC, Questions and Answers Concerning
Year 2000 Contingency Planning (visited Dec. 11, 1998) <http:\\www.
ffiec.gov\y2kqa.htm>; FFIEC, Guidance Concerning Fiduciary Services and Year
2000 Readiness (visited Sept. 2, 1998) <http:\\www.ffiec.gov\y2k\826y2k.htm>
[hereinafter Fiduciary Services]; FFIEC, Guidance Concerning Contingency
Planning in Connection with Year 2000 Readiness (visited May 13, 1998)
<http:\\www.ffiec.gov/y2k/contplan.htm>; FFIEC, Guidance on Year 2000
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guidances culminated in the issuance of interim joint interagency guidelines
on Year 2000 standards for safety and soundness of banks and thrifts, which
were published on October 15, 1998 and took effect immediately. 7 The
agencies invited comment on the guidelines for a sixty day period.
The guidelines, which will be referred to throughout as the "Year
2000 Guidelines" or "the Guidelines," were intended to supplement, not
supplant, FFIEC's guidances, which continued to apply to insured
institutions and their affiliates. 18 The Year 2000 Guidelines described
essential steps that insured banks and thrifts were required to take to assure
Year 2000 readiness. While the standards were couched as guidelines, they
were mandatory in effect.' 9 By law, the Guidelines only applied to insured
depository institutions, not to bank holding companies or U.S. offices of
foreign banking organizations. Nonetheless, regulators expected regulated
entities other than insured banks and thrifts to comply with the FFIEC
guidances, under pain of federal sanctions.
20
Customer Awareness Programs (visited May 13, 1998) <http:\\www.ffiec.gov/y2k/
custpro.htm> [hereinafter Customer Awareness Programs]; FFIEC, Guidance
Concerning Testing for Year 2000 Readiness (visited Apr. 10 1998)
<http:\\www.ffiec.gov/y2k/guidance.htm> [hereinafter Testing For Year 2000
Readiness]; FFIEC, Guidance Concerning the Year 2000 Impact on Customers
(visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http:\\www.ffiec.gov/y2k/impact.htm> [hereinafter Year
2000 Impact on Customers]; FFIEC, Guidance Concerning Institution Due
Diligence in Connection with Service Providers and Software Vendor Year 2000
Readiness (visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http:\\www.ffiec.gov/y2k/ vendor.htm>
[hereinafter Institution Due Diligence]; FFIEC, Safety and Soundness Guidelines
Concerning the Year 2000 Business Risk (visited Dec. 17, 1997)
<http:\\www.ffiec.gov/y2k/federal.htm> [hereinafter Year 2000 Business Risk];
Project Management Awareness, supra note 12; FFIEC, The Effect of Year 2000 on
Computer Systems (visited June 1996) <http:\\www.ffiec.gov/y2k/ sr9616.htm>
[hereinafter Computer Systems].
17 Interagency Guidelines Establishing Year 2000 Standards for Safety and
Soundness, 63 Fed. Reg. 55480 (1998) [hereinafter Interagency Guidelines]
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 30 app. B, pt. 208 app. D-2, pt. 364 app. B, pt. 570 app.
B). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Federal
Reserve System jointly issued the guidelines. Numerous state bank and thrift
regulators issued Year 2000 regulations as well. See Alex D. McElroy, State Bank
Rules Track Federal Rules on Fixing Year 2000 Computer Problems, 72 BNA
BANKING REP. 99 (1999).
's See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,480-81.
19 See id. at 55,481.
20 Seeid. at 55,482; see generally 12 U.S.C. § 1818.
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Authority for the Year 2000 Guidelines came from 12 U.S.C. §
1831p-1, which requires federal banking regulators to establish operational
and managerial standards for insured banks and thrifts on internal controls,
information systems and internal audit systems.' Standards under Section
1831p-1 may either take the form of regulations or guidelines.22 For the
topic of Year 2000 readiness, federal regulators decided to proceed by way
of guidelines to preserve their flexibility to take appropriate supervisory
action against institutions that failed to comply.23 On the same date that the
Year 2000 Guidelines were published, regulators also amended the
regulations implementing the safety and soundness provisions in Section
183 lp-1 in order to incorporate the Guidelines2 4 The Year 2000 Guidelines
divided the Year 2000 remediation process into six phases, consisting of
awareness, assessment, renovation, testing, contingency planning and
implementation.
A. Awareness And Assessment
Awareness and assessment of the problem were the first steps on the
road to Year 2000 readiness. Since 1996, federal banking regulators were
increasingly insistent that leadership and support for Year 2000 compliance
came directly from the executive suite and the boardroom. Thus, it was
incumbent on management and the board to assemble a Year 2000
management team that was led by a senior manager, to provide that team
with sufficient funds and personnel, and to set an example by emphasizing
Year 2000 compliance as a high priority of the institution. A budget had to
be established with sufficient funds to pay for personnel with appropriate
skills, contractors, vendor support, software development and new hardware
(keeping in mind that obtaining and retaining qualified staff became
increasingly harder as the Year 2000 deadline approached). Regulators
stressed the importance of corporate accountability by requiring direct
reporting to top management and the board and clear lines of command and
responsibility.
26
In the assessment phase, the size and complexity of the Year 2000
problem had to be assessed and solutions identified. It was not cost-
21 See generally Joseph Jude Norton & Sherry Castle Whitley, BANKING LAW
MANUAL § 13.02 (Patricia A. McCoy ed., Dec. 1998).
22 12 U.S.C. § 183 lp-l(d)(1).
23 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,481-82. See Section V.B infra
for a discussion of agency enforcement.
24 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,486.
25 See, e.g., Year 2000 Business Risk, supra note 16; Project Management
Awareness, supra note 12; Computer Systems, supra note 16.
26 See Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
[Vol. 19:153
2000] TECHNOLOGY SHIFTS AND THE LAW: YEAR 2000 READINESS 161
effective, let alone possible, to revise or replace every line of infected code.
Recognizing that fact, federal banking regulators required banks and thrifts
to come up with an action plan and employ a triage system to identify which
systems, applications and software were crucial to their business. This basic
requirement was embodied in the command that every bank and thrift had to
inventory their hardware and software systems, identify all internal and
external "mission-critical systems" that were not Year 2000 ready and
prepare a project plan to achieve Year 2000 compliance.27 Institutions also
had to make plans for fixing lower priority systems sometime later after
critical repairs were completed. 28 The awareness and assessment phases
were to have been completed by September 30, 1997.29
Three terms were key to understanding the priorities for triage. The
first was the term "mission-critical systems." Mission-critical systems were
defined as applications, systems and software that were vital to the
successful continuance of a core business activity. Applications, systems
and software could also be mission-critical if they interfaced with a mission-
critical system.30
The second key term was "internal system." An internal system was
any digital system whose repair the bank or thrift controlled. Internal
systems included software, operating systems, mainframe computers,
personal computers, ATM machines, readers/sorters and proof machines, as
well as environmental systems that depended on embedded microchips (such
as heating and cooling systems, vaults, communications, security systems
and elevators).3 '
During the assessment phase, institutions were required to set
priorities for repairing internal systems that were mission-critical and paying
for those repairs (which the agencies referred to as "renovation"). The initial
task of the institution's Year 2000 team was to identify systems qualifying
for triage (including systems in remote or overseas offices) and decide
whether those systems should be modified, replaced, outsourced or
discontinued. Once those decisions were made, the team had to establish
reasonable deadlines for commencing and completing repairs or
replacement.32
27 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,484.
28 See Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
29 See Institution Due Diligence, supra note 16.
30 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,484.
31 See id.; Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
32 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,484; Computer Systems, supra
note 16. Year 2000 plans also needed to address the so-called "leap year" issue, i.e.,
the ability of computers to recognize the date February 29, 2000. See Project
Management Awareness, supra note 12.
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Finally, "external systems" that were mission-critical had to be
scrutinized for needed repairs. An external system was one whose repair was
not within the control of the affected bank or thrift. External systems
included systems furnished by outside data processing service providers or
software vendors. In addition, external systems included electronic data
exchange systems with other institutions such as correspondent banks, their
customers and regulators.33 For data exchanges, it was important to identify
what types of electronic data exchanges were operating and how those data
exchanges differed from one another.34 Special risks were posed where
institutions did business on an electronic basis globally with foreign
institutions that were not Year 2000 ready.
35
For software vendors and other third party suppliers, banks and
thrifts had to establish a due diligence process to monitor and evaluate their
efforts to achieve Year 2000 readiness.36 Management was required to
evaluate vendors' own readiness plans and actively monitor project
milestones. It was crucial that management obtain assurance that vendors
had the funds and personnel to complete their own Year 2000 compliance so
that they could honor their contractual obligations to provide uninterrupted
service. It was similarly crucial that vendors certify Year 2000 compliance
for all work or services that they performed. Federal regulators required
management to review vendor contracts to determine who would bear the
costs of Year 2000 compliance and to renegotiate those contracts where
necessary to include Year 2000 covenants. Where a vendor refused to agree
to such a covenant, the institution was required to weigh the cost of
terminating the contract and replacing the service or product. The institution
had to terminate the relationship with the vendor where the safety and
soundness of the institution was at risk.37
Whenever institutions made new purchases of systems, software or
hardware, they had to require the seller to certify in writing that the purchase
33 See Interagency Guidelines Establishing Year 2000 Standards for Safety and
Soundness, 63 Fed. Reg. at 55,484. External systems reviewed had to include
payment system providers such as wire transfer systems, automated clearing houses,
check clearing providers, credit card merchant and issuing systems, ATM networks,
electronic data interchange systems and electronic benefits transfer systems. See
Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
34 See Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
35 See Nicholas J. Zoogman & Joshua Gold, Year 2000 Liability and Insurance
Coverage Issues for Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 115 BANKING L.J. 671,
675 (1998).
36 Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,484.
37 See Institution Due Diligence, supra note 16.
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was Year 2000 compliant.38 Such sales contracts were required to include
language along the following lines: A "[Licensor] [Seller] represents and
warrants that the software will not fail or produce anomalous or incorrect
results with respect to data, calculations, and other processing involving
dates after December 31, 1999." 39 Where sellers resisted such clauses,
institutions could use statements in the FFIEC guidances that required banks
to modify or terminate vendor contracts as negotiating leverage where
vendors sought to limit their total liability and exclude damages for lost
profits and other forms of consequential damages*
40
Similar considerations applied to hiring personnel to make Year
2000 repairs or system overhauls. Those personnel had to be under contract
whenever possible to ensure that they would be available when needed.
They had to guarantee that their work would be Year 2000 compliant.
41
Once management had identified the mission-critical products and
services supplied by service providers and software vendors, it was required
to request the following information from those suppliers:
42
* Information on the vendors' Year 2000 project plans,
including the scope of such efforts, a summary of resource
commitments, target dates for repairs and testing and
anticipated dates of delivery for Year 2000 products and
services;
* Any plans to discontinue or extensively modify existing
services and products;
* Regular updates on suppliers' progress in meeting their own
Year 2000 timetables;
* Estimates of the product and support costs to the institution
for repairs and testing; and
* The suppliers' contingency plans in case they failed to
successfully complete their Year 2000 plans.
In repairing external software or systems, institutions needed to be
aware that adverse legal consequences could flow from unilaterally rewriting
computer code. Service providers and software vendors typically included
clauses in their original service contracts to the effect that unauthorized code
modifications would render warranties and service contracts null and void.
Similarly, many software licenses forbade users from providing third parties
with access to the software without the licensor's consent as illegal copyright
38 See Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
39 Keehan & Peterson, supra note 8, at 484.
40 See id.
41 See Project Management Awareness, supra note 16.
42 See Institution Due Diligence, supra note 16.
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infringement.a3 Confronted with such clauses, institutions had to make a
difficult choice between avoiding the risk of suit and the urgency of attaining
Year 2000 readiness.44
The assessment phase was to culminate in a Year 2000 project plan
that mapped out timetables and plans for each phase of repair work, testing,
implementation and contingency planning. Plans were required to address:
45
* The tasks to be accomplished throughout the duration of the
project;
* The necessary resources and the individuals who were
responsible for each phase of the project;
* Specific dates for completing key elements of the project;
and
* Strategies for responding to inquiries from customers and
business partners regarding Year 2000 readiness.
Institutions that had comparable plans in place when the Guidelines
were adopted were not required to draft new plans, assuming that their
existing plans met with agency approval.
46
B. Customer Risk
Part of the external Year 2000 threat to depository institutions arose
from liquidity concerns if customers such as fund providers, fund takers or
capital market or asset management counter parties such as derivatives
customers defaulted on their contractual obligations due to their own Year
2000 problems. Depositors and other fund providers potentially posed
liquidity risks if they were unable to provide funds or fulfill their funding
commitments to institutions. Funds takers such as borrowers and bond
issuers who borrowed or used bank funds potentially posed credit risk
through defaults on loan or bond payments. Finally, an institution's market
trading, treasury operations and fiduciary activities could have suffered if
customers who were active in domestic and global financial markets were
unable to settle transactions due to operations problems arising from the Year
2000 date change.47
To reduce that exposure, the Year 2000 Guidelines required senior
management of banks and thrifts to develop and implement written due
diligence procedures to identify customers who posed material Year 2000-
43 See Greaves, supra note 2, at 423.
44 See Institution Due Diligence supra note 1; Greaves, supra note 2, at 423-24.
45 See Year 2000 Business Risk, supra note 16.
46 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,481; Project Management
Awareness, supra note 12.
47 See Year 2000 Impact on Customers, supra note 16.
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related risks to the institution. By June 30, 1998, institutions were required
to implement their due diligence processes. Assessments of individual
customers' Year 2000 preparedness and the resulting impact on each bank or
thrift were to have been completed by September 30, 1998.
Based on those assessments, management was expected to
implement appropriate risk controls (including controls for underwriting
risk) to manage and mitigate the Year 2000 risk posed by the institution's
customers.48 Those risk controls could be tailored to the institution's size,
culture, appetite for risk, the complexity of customers' information and
operating systems, and the institution's overall Year 2000 exposure. In
smaller community institutions, customers might not have been as dependent
on information technology as clients of larger institutions and thus the due
diligence processes in those institutions did not need to be as extensive or
formal.49
In a FFIEC guidance dated March 17, 1998 titled "Guidance
Concerning the Year 2000 Impact on Customers," federal regulators outlined
their expectations for due diligence as to customer risk. According to the
guidance, due diligence was to accomplish the following objectives:
(1) Identify Material Customers Posing Year 2000 Risk:
Management had to identify customers, including customers
abroad, that posed material risk to the institution due to lack
of preparedness for the century date change. Material risk
exposure could depend on the following factors, where
applicable:
* The size of the overall relationship with the
customer;
* The risk rating of borrowers and other funds takers;
0 The complexity of the customer's operating and
information technology systems;
* The customer's reliance on technology for
successful business operations;
* The collateral exposure of borrowers;
* The funding volume or credit sensitivity of funds
providers;
* The degree of management oversight of Year 2000
repairs by the customer;
* The resources the customer had committed to its
Year 2000 projects; and
48 See Interagency Guidelines Establishing Year 2000 Standards for Safety and
Soundness, 63 Fed. Reg. at 55485.
49 See Year 2000 Impact on Customers, supra note 16.
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* The customer's dependence on third party providers
of data processing services or products.
(2) Assess The Year 2000 Readiness Of Material Custdmers:
Each customer who was identified as material had to be
assessed for its Year 2000 preparedness. Management was
required to train account officers to perform a basic
assessment of the Year 2000 risk posed by customers. To
that end, the institution was required to develop one or more
standardized questionnaires for eliciting customer
response.
50
For customers who either used manual systems or
depended on commercial software products and services,
this assessment could be less involved and did not
necessarily require additional risk management oversight.
Customers' Year 2000 readiness was to be reevaluated at
least semiannually, and quarterly for customers who posed
significant Year 2000 risk. The results of the Year 2000
assessments, ensuing discussions and status updates were to
be documented in customers' individual files.
(3) Evaluate Year 2000 Risk To The Institution: After
identifying and surveying material customers, management
was required to assess the Year 2000 risk that those
customers posed to the institution, both individually and
collectively. Management had to determine whether risk
exposure was high, medium or low.
(4) Develop Appropriate Risk Controls: Once the level of
customer risk was determined, management had to develop
and institute appropriate controls to control that risk. Senior
management needed to be actively engaged in developing
those controls and assuring their timely implementation.
Frequently, the types of risk controls that had to be instituted
depended on the category of customer. Federal regulators
prescribed the following special risk controls for funds
takers, funds providers and capital market and asset
management counter parties:5'
(a) Borrowers And Bond Issuers ("Funds Takers'):
During the credit underwriting process, management
50 Appendices A-D of Year 2000 Impact on Customers, supra note 16, contained
sample questionnaires that some depository institutions used to assess customer
readiness.
51 See Year 2000 Impact on Customers, supra note 16.
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had to evaluate the extent of the borrower's Year
2000 risk. Underwriters needed sufficient training
to enable them to conduct a basic assessment of the
applicant's Year 2000 risk. They had to then
evaluate whether that risk would materially affect
the applicant's cash flow, balance sheet or the value
of the supporting collateral. Once credit was
approved, the loan documentation had to include
language that would permit the institution to monitor
and manage the customer's Year 2000 risk.
Institutions had to consider incorporating the
following clauses into their loan agreements and
supporting documentation:
52
* Borrower representations that Year
2000 programs were in place;
* Representations that borrowers
would disclose Year 2000 plans to
the lender, provide periodic updates
on their progress under those plans
and provide copies of any third-
party assessments of the borrower's
Year 2000 readiness;
* Clauses requiring audits on Year
2000 issues;
* Covenants ensuring that adequate
resources would be committed to
completing the Year 2000 plan on
time; and
* Default provisions allowing the
lender to accelerate the maturity of
the debt for noncompliance with
Year 2000 covenants.
After the loan or bond offering closed, the institution
needed to conduct progress reports on customer
Year 2000 preparedness as part of its ongoing credit
52 See also Project Management Awareness, supra note 12. For sample language,
see Brad L. Peterson & John P. Brockland, Negotiating Year 2000 Provisions in
Finance Transactions, in Understanding, Preventing and Litigating Year 2000
Issues: What Every Lawyer Needs to Know Now, Supplement 281 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property Course Handbook Series, Order No.
GO-004Q 1998).
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administration." Senior management of banks and
thrifts were expected to establish procedures to
identify, assess and control potential Year 2000 risk
in their lending and investment portfolios.1
4
For example, when performing follow-up
credit analyses, loan officers had to determine
whether the customer's Year 2000 risk required an
adjustment to its internal risk rating. Similarly,
periodic reviews of the adequacy of loan and lease
loss provisions had to take account of customers'
Year 2000 risk. If a customer's creditworthiness
deteriorated due to Year 2000 problems, loan and
lease loss provisions had to be increased sufficiently
to reflect the increased credit risk. Where necessary,
loans had to be classified or written off.
Management's analysis of the inherent loss in loan
and bond portfolios overall also had to reflect Year
2000 risk posed by customers.
55
(b) Depositors And Other Funds Providers: As with
borrowers, management had to identify significant
depositors and other funds providers, evaluate their
Year 2000 readiness where possible and assess the
associated Year 2000 risks. Management needed to
be cognizant of concentrations (including
concentrations in any single currency) from an
individual provider or group of providers who might
not have been Year 2000 ready. This risk
assessment had to be incorporated into the
institution's contingency plan for liquidity. The
contingency plan was required to evaluate a number
of scenarios based on different assumptions about
the timing or magnitude of funds shortfalls due to
Year 2000-related problems. Where an institution
had significant funds flows in different currencies, it
needed a separate contingency plan for each major
53 See also Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
m See Year 2000 Business Risk, supra note 16.
55 For a good general overview of the Year 2000 issues presented by borrowers,
see Jay Goiter & Paloma Hawry, What Every Loan Officer Needs to Know about the
Year 2000 Computer Problem (But Doesn't Know How to Ask), 10 FDIC BANKING
REV. 1 (1997).
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currency. The ability to plan for and mitigate
potential liquidity risks was aided by the fact that the
trigger date for those risks was already known. For
instance, institutions were advised to extend the
maturity of their advances under funding lines
sufficiently past January 1, 2000 to provide time to
assess the effect of Year 2000 on their funds
providers. Maintaining close contact with funding
sources throughout the critical New Year's Day
2000 weekend also provided management with
timely, market-sensitive information essential to
effective liquidity planning.
(c) Capital Market And Asset Management Counter
Parties:56 Year 2000 concerns with securities or
derivatives customers ranged from the customer's
failure to complete a transaction, with potential to
lead to a systemic liquidity crisis, to the customer's
financial failure, possibly leading to total loss of the
value of the payment or contract. Furthermore,
where an institution was acting in a fiduciary
capacity, a counter party's failure to remit bond
payments, fund employer pension contributions or
settle securities transactions could heighten the
institution's fiduciary risk.57 An institution's first
task in this regard was to identify customers who
posed large exposures to the bank and/or fiduciary
account beneficiaries. The Year 2000 readiness of
those customers had to be appraised. Where the
institution did not have sufficient assurance that
those customers would achieve readiness on time,
management was to pursue mitigation measures
such as early termination agreements, additional
collateral, netting arrangements and third-party
16 See Christian A. Johnson, Year 2000 Credit Risk and Derivatives: Insulating
Banks From Counterparty Meltdown, 9 BANKING L.J. 930 (1998) for a discussion of
additional actions banks and thrifts could have taken to address the risk of counter
party defaults due to Year 2000 malfunctions.
See also Fiduciary Services, supra note 16.
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payment arrangement or guarantees.58 Where a
customer posed high uncertainty, the bank or thrift
had to consider avoiding any transactions with that
customer with settlement risk after January 1, 2000.
The interest rate effect of material mismatches of
funding, or maturity, also had to be assessed as
maturity and settlement risk were adjusted. The
institution was not to resume normal transaction
activities with the customer until it demonstrated
that it would in fact be prepared for the century date
change.
(d) Special Considerations For Institutions Acting As
Fiduciaries: In addition to the normal due diligence
just described for capital market and asset
management counter parties, institutions that offered
fiduciary services needed to evaluate the potential
Year 2000 risks from managing client assets.
Account assets had to be thoroughly reviewed to
ascertain potential liability or exposure attributable
to issuers of securities with Year 2000 problems.
Certain types of assets, such as closely held
companies, partnership interests, and income
producing real estate, could also have been the
source of possible Year 2000 exposure. If an
institution relied on third party service providers
such as transfer agents, depositories, investment
advisors, custodial agencies and the like to meet
their fiduciary duties, the institution had to evaluate
the Year 2000 readiness of those providers and
make contingency plans in case their services went
awry. In consultation with counsel, disclosures to
beneficiaries about the institution's Year 2000
preparations and significant Year 2000 issues with
third parties, counter parties and specific asset
holding in customer accounts were advised to reduce
the risk of litigation.5 9
58 Christian Johnson urged banks to have the Master Agreement developed by the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) in place prior to doing any
derivatives trading with a customer. See Johnson, supra note 56, at 933, 949-52.
59 See Fiduciary Services, supra note 16.
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From a business standpoint, the due diligence that was required of
customers was undoubtedly one of the most sensitive aspects of Year 2000
readiness. The due diligence requirements listed above could endanger
longstanding relationships with valued customers. Customers might have
been unwilling to produce volumes of confidential information, particularly
when their agreements did not have covenants that required them to
cooperate. Where documentation did not require access, occasionally there
was little more the institution could do than refuse to do business in the
future if the customer did not comply. Rather than cooperate, however, some
customers may have shifted their business to non-bank financial service
providers who did not make intrusive demands for information. Banks and
thrifts thus were forced to weigh whether potential defection by customers
was worth the business and legal risk of lack of Year 2000 readiness,
mindful that a customer's non-cooperation could have been a harbinger of
serious problems.
To some extent, banks could avoid having tensions reach the boiling
point by working in advance to forestall any problem. In the lending area,
for example, if a bank had concern that a borrower's progress toward Year
2000 preparedness was so slow that the bank eventually might have to write
down the loan, the bank was advised to contact the borrower as far as
possible in advance to give it an opportunity to fix the problem. Banks also
preserved their flexibility in dealing with borrowers by satisfying examiners
that they had an effective due diligence process in place for monitoring the
Year 2000 progress of creditors.
60
C. Repairs And / Or Replacement ("Renovation")
The Year 2000 Guidelines used the term "renovation" to refer to the
process of repair and replacement. Renovation included code enhancements,
hardware and software upgrades, system replacements, and other related
changes that ensured that an institution's mission-critical systems and
applications were Year 2000 ready.6' Federal regulators vigorously
discouraged institutions from using operating systems or other components
that were not Year 2000 ready because unanticipated problems could arise
62
Under the Year 2000 Guidelines, repairs of internal mission-critical systems
had to be completed in time to substantially complete testing of those repairs
by December 31, 1998.63
60 See Keehan & Peterson, supra note 8, at 484.
61 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,484.
62 See Questions and Answers, supra note 8.
63 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17 at 55,484.
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The deadline for completing repairs of external mission-critical
systems fell three months later. Under the Guidelines, banks and thrifts were
required to determine the ability of third party suppliers to make needed
repairs to external mission-critical systems in time to substantially complete
testing of those repairs by March 31, 1999. In addition, institutions had to
develop a written, ongoing due diligence process to monitor and evaluate the
efforts of third party suppliers to achieve Year 2000 readiness. As part of
that process, banks and thrifts had to keep written documentation of their
communications with outside suppliers as to their ability to make timely and
effective repairs. Repair efforts of third party suppliers had to be monitored
at least quarterly.
In addition, institutions were required to review their contracts with
outside suppliers to determine the parties' rights and obligations to achieve
Year 2000 compliance.64 Some outside service providers and software
vendors were unable or unwilling to correct Year 2000 problems. In some
cases, the developers of software or hardware had gone out of business or no
longer supported the application or system in question. Source code was not
always available or equipment sometimes had components that were no
longer manufactured. Major software providers were sometimes unwilling
to provide specific reconfiguration instructions that were tailored to the
institution's individual system. To address these problems, federal regulators
broadened their Year 2000 examinations to include service providers and
software vendors and announced that they would share results from those
examinations with affected banks and thrifts. (Federal regulators stressed,
however, that they would not certify service providers as Year 2000
compliant). 65 Federal regulators also exerted pressure on those providers to
provide the fullest information possible to their customers
66
D. Testing
Testing of repairs was just as important as the repairs themselves.
Federal regulators described testing as "the most critical phase of the Year
64 See id. at 55,484-85; Institution Due Diligence, supra note 16.
65 See Questions and Answers, supra note 8; Institution Due Diligence, supra note
16. FFIEC established a Year 2000 examination program for at least sixteen large
service providers and a sister program for at least twenty two large software vendors.
Those providers and vendors furmished data processing for, or provided software to,
a large number of financial institutions regulated by more than one agency. Each of
those suppliers potentially posed a high degree of systemic risk. FFIEC disclosed
examination results for service providers to client institutions as a matter of course.
It disclosed examination results for software vendors to client institutions only with
the vendor's consent.
66 See Institution Due Diligence, supra note 16.
[Vol. 19: 153
2000] TECHNOLOGY SHIFTS AND THE LAW: YEAR 2000 READINESS 173
2000 readiness process" and one that could easily consume fifty to sixty
percent of the time, funding and personnel dedicated to an institution's Year
2000 project.67 Regulators warned that failure to perform adequate testing
"pose[d] a risk to the safe and sound operation" of an institution and could
"mask serious remediation problems.'6 8
Testing was complicated by the fact that the software and hardware
changes that were needed for Year 2000 compliance could have affected
many or all of an institution's internal systems, as well as interfaces with
internal and external suppliers, customers and business partners.
Accordingly, testing needs varied according to the institution. Mission-
critical systems were to be tested first, due to their importance to an
institution's operations and the urgency of finding an alternate solution if
testing failed.6? Testing had to be designed so as not to interfere with day-to-
day processing activities. All tests had to be conducted by whomever was in
the best position to perform tests and assess the results.70
The Year 2000 Guidelines set staged deadlines for testing mission-
critical systems. Substantially complete testing of internal mission-critical
systems was to have been completed by December 31, 1998. Testing of
external mission-critical systems was to commence by January 1, 1999 and
to be substantially completed three months later, on March 31.7  Testing
with third parties (other than suppliers) with whom the bank or thrift
exchanged electronic data (known as "other material third parties" and
including credit bureaus and other business partners, other banks and thrifts,
payment system providers, clearinghouses, customers and utilities) had to
begin by March 31, 1999.72 June 30, 1999 was the final deadline for testing
all mission-critical systems.73
The testing process started with developing and implementing
effective written plans for testing both internal and external systems. Federal
regulators expected those plans to address the testing environment, testing
methodology, testing schedules, budget projections, the identity of
67 See Testing for Year 2000 Readiness, supra note 16; see also Interagency
Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,482.
68 Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,482.
69 See Testing for Year 2000 Readiness, supra note 16.
70 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,485; Testing for Year 2000
Readiness, supra note 16; Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
71 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,485; Testing for Year 2000
Readiness, supra note 16.
72 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,484-85; Testing for Year 2000
Readiness, supra note 16; see also Questions and Answers, supra note 8.
71 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,485; Testing for Year 2000
Readiness, supra note 16.
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participants and critical target dates.74 Testing plans were to contain the
following elements:
75
* Testing Environment: This element considered whether to
use current operating computers or a separate computer
system to test.
* Test Methodology: This segment identified the types of tests
that were needed. 6 Although regulators preferred that
systems be tested in an institution's own environment, that
was not always possible for institutions that relied on service
providers or software purchased from vendors. In such
cases, banks or thrifts were allowed to rely on proxy tests-
tests performed on a representative sample of financial
institutions that used the same service on the same
platform--conducted by service providers or user groups, so
long as those tests were appropriate.77  Alternatively,
institutions could have tested their upgraded applications at
hot-site locations (disaster recovery sites) so long as tests
were run on the same hardware and operating systems.
78
Banks and thrifts were strongly advised not to test system
clocks by rolling dates forward without consulting with the
manufacturer or vendor.79  Similarly, reliance on
74 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,485; Testing for Year 2000
Readiness, supra note 16; Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
75 See Testing for Year 2000 Readiness, supra note 16.
76 See Testing for Year 2000 Readiness, supra note 16, for a discussion of test
methodologies.
77 See Questions and Answers, supra note 8. When service providers conducted
proxy tests, those tests were to be conducted on institutions of the same type and
complexity and use identical versions of the software, operating systems and
hardware. Client institutions were required to define the scope and objectives of
such tests. Test results had to be documented, validated and assessed to determine
their reliability. Institutions were required to independently test any functions of
their systems that were not covered by proxy tests. Federal regulators also allowed
proxy testing of turnkey software packages provided by software vendors on the
same conditions. See id
Proxy tests were not appropriate where the institution modified the software
code. In addition, where proxy tests were properly used, institutions had to test
internal and external interfaces not covered by the tests and other items under their
control. See id
78 See Questions and Answers, supra note 8.
79 See id.
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certification by a nationally recognized organization was not
a substitute for actual tests.
80
Test Schedule: Timetables had to be established for testing
software, hardware and interfaces between systems. Test
schedules needed to be coordinated with the test schedules
of third parties.
Personnel And Funds: A testing budget had to be established
and testing personnel identified.
Critical Test Dates: January 1, 2000 was not the only date
with the potential for confusion. Other dates, such as 9999
on the Julian and Gregorian calendars (respectively April 9
and September 9, 1999), and leap year day (February 29,
2000) could wreak havoc if the Year 2000 bug was not
fixed.81 Institutions were required to determine what dates
their systems were prone to misread and test to make certain
that their applications and systems would operate properly
when confronted with those dates.
Documentation: Each stage of the testing process had to be
documented to make it easier to pinpoint the source of any
problems if testing failed. Documentation had to be
sufficient to enable a reasonably knowledgeable person to
understand which tests were performed on which
applications, systems or hardware, what the results were, and
how those results were validated.82 This documentation had
'o See id.
81 See Testing for Year 2000 Readiness, supra note 16, for a list of possibly
troublesome dates. Institutions did not need to test listed dates if those dates were
not critical to particular applications. Conversely, institutions had to test other dates
that did not appear on the FFIEC list but that could prove troublesome. See
Questions and Answers, supra note 8.
82 Regulators advised retaining, among other things, documentation of the
following: the institution's overall Year 2000 plan and Year 2000 testing plan; the
types of tests performed (e.g., baseline, unit, regression) and a summary of the
results; the reason why the institution chose the tests and the extensiveness of the
tests; the criteria used to determine whether an application or system was Year 2000
ready; plans for repairing and re-testing any computers, systems or application that
failed the tests; names of the individuals responsible for authorizing the testing plan
and accepting test results; communications with service providers and software
vendors, including any assurances regarding their services or products; copies of any
in-house programs that produced test results; and any other documentation that the
institution believed supported its decisions, conclusions and due diligence. See
Questions and Answers, supra note 8.
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to be retained both for purposes of examinations and to
enable the institution to demonstrate that it fulfilled its
responsibilities in the event of litigation 8
3
Where the system being tested was an external system that interfaced
with an outside computer system or was under third-party control, it was
crucial to coordinate inside tests with outside testing. If outside service
providers or software vendors conducted the testing, federal regulators
expected senior management to monitor the process and obtain satisfactory
assurances that the systems were properly and successfully tested 5 While
institutions were advised to get assurances from outside vendors that their
products and services were Year 2000 compliant, management could not rest
on those assurances. All electronic products and services provided by
outside vendors had to be tested whenever possible in the institution's own
environment to ensure that the vendors' systems and the institution's other
systems meshed. 6 Management had to specifically ask vendors to explain
the scope of testing, the objectives to be attained and the scenarios to be
tested. As part of those scenarios, any tests were supposed to simulate and
measure the impact of a Year 2000-related disaster on normal operations.
Vendors were expected to provide management with testing schedules and
failure to do so raised a red flag.
8 7
If service providers or software vendors balked at providing
sufficient information about their testing efforts, institutions were to
complain directly to the suppliers. Institutions were also advised to join
forces with other institutions, as part of a user group, to exert collective
pressure for adequate information. If problems continued or if laggard
suppliers could not meet the institution's target dates, institutions had to
activate their remediation contingency plans88 In all cases, the appropriate
federal regulator had to be notified if problems occurred89 Regulators
emphasized that the onus was on depository institutions, not on federal
examiners, to ensure that vendors were Year 2000 compliant.90
83 See Questions and Answers, supra note 8.
84 See Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
85 See Testing for Year 2000 Readiness, supra note 16; Year 2000 Business Risk,
supra note 16.
86 See Institution Due Diligence, supra note 16; Year 2000 Business Risk, supra
note 16.
87 See id.
88 See Section III.E.2 infra.
89 See Questions and Answers, supra note 8.
90 See Jerry Goldfarb, Bankers Advised to Partner With Vendors Because Fed
Oversight Not Forthcoming, 70 BNA BANKING REP. 50 (1998).
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The Year 2000 project plan also had to provide for testing and
verification of electronic data exchanges with correspondent banks, clearing
associations, government agencies, customers, credit bureaus, payment
system providers, securities firms, international financial institutions and,
where possible, phone companies and utilities. The object of those tests was
to verify that each institution's network protocol, business applications and
operating system platforms worked normally. 9' FFIEC encouraged
depository institutions to participate in joint testing coordinated by industry
trade associations and other organizations as a cost-effective way to conduct
tests of crucial transactions with other institutions and businesses
92
Examples included opportunities by the Federal Reserve System for single-
application, end-to-end and shared testing to allow institutions to test systems
such Fed Wire and automated clearing house transactions with Fed
interfaces, either singly or simultaneously.93 Congress shielded joint testing
and related communications from antitrust liability in the "Year 2000
Information and Readiness Disclosure Act.'9
4
Questions whether to retest arose where systems that had already
been tested underwent later upgrades. The institution was required to ask the
service provider or software vendor in question to identify the changes being
made and describe the extent to which internal tests were conducted before
releasing the upgrade. If the changes did not affect date fields or date-related
calculations, the financial institution did not necessarily need to test (other
than to perform the routine acceptance testing that would accompany the
installation of any software upgrade). Otherwise, the institution had to
assure that the upgrade underwent appropriate Year 2000 testing and that the
supplier warranted that specific testing was performed to ensure continued
Year 2000 readiness. 95
91 See Testing for Year 2000 Readiness, supra note 16; Project Management
Awareness, supra note 12.
92 See, e.g., Questions and Answers, supra note 8; Steven Marjanovic, MBA Plans
Industrywide Testing Project to Blunt Year-2000 Threat, AM. BANKER, at 8 (Jan. 27,
1998).
93 See Fed Says It Will Keep Even Closer Eye on Year 2000-Related Efforts by
Banks, 70 BNA BANKING REP. 423 (1998); Jaret Seiberg, Fed to Test Payment
System Immunity to Year-2000 Glitch, AM. BANKER, at 1-2 (Jan. 27, 1998); Year
2000: Year 2000 Testing Is Well Under Way In Many Financial Institutions, Fed
Says, 71 BNA BANKING REP. 711 (1998).
94 Pub. L. No. 105-271, §§ 5(a)-(b), 112 Stat. 2386 (1998). The exemption did
not apply to conduct that involved or resulted in an agreement to boycott any person,
to allocate a market, or to fix prices or output. See Pub. L. No. 105-27 1, § 5(c), 112
Stat. 2386 (1998).
95 See Questions and Answers, supra note 8.
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The last part of the testing process was verification. In this stage,
institutions were expected to verify the adequacy of their testing processes
and validate their test results. At a minimum, test verification had to involve
the institution's Year 2000 project manager, the owner of the system tested
and an objective independent party (such as an auditor, a consultant or other
qualified individual from within or outside the insured institution who was
independent of the process under review). Internal personnel could be used
as long as they were qualified and independent of the process being verified.
This review was designed to ensure that the tests were effective, that critical
dates were checked and that the repairs or upgrades resulted in reliable
processing of information. Where an institution relied on proxy testing,
management had to ensure that the tests were independently verified.
Outside vendors also were required to verify their own tests and supply
management with the results.
96
E. Contingency Planning
While the goal of Year 2000 repairs and testing was to avoid
breakdowns, it was impossible to insure that operations would proceed
wholly without interruption. The inability to assure complete Year 2000
readiness in the business world at large was reason enough for lack of
assurance. Consequently, federal banking regulators required banks and
thrifts to devise thorough contingency plans in case the worst came to pass.
Senior management and the board were charged with overseeing the
development and implementation of contingency plans. All contingency
plans had to be reviewed at least quarterly and adjusted, if necessary, to
reflect changing circumstances. If changes were necessary, those changes
had to be approved by senior management and the board. In addition, an
independent party (such as an internal or external auditor, a qualified
consultant or a qualified person from an independent area within the
institution) was supposed to review the contingency plans.97
1. Business Resumption Contingency Plans
The Year 2000 Guidelines required every institution to draft
contingency plans for what FFIEC referred to euphemistically as "business
resumption" (i.e., business interruption). The requirement for business
resumption contingency plans reflected regulators' lack of total assurance
96 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,485 (1998); Questions and
Answers, supra note 8; Testing for Year 2000 Readiness, supra note 16; Project
Management Awareness, supra note 12.
97 See Questions and Answers, supra note 8; Institution Due Diligence, supra note
16; Year 2000 Business Risk, supra note 16.
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that systems would operate as expected, despite the Year 2000 remediation
campaign. Such plans addressed the possibility that core business processes
might fail, even though an institution was seemingly successful in
renovating, testing and implementing Year 2000 readiness. The objective of
business remediation contingency plans was to minimize such disruptions to
the institution, its customers and business partners, minimize financial losses
and ensure a timely resumption of operations in the event a Year 2000
disruption occurred. Unlike remediation contingency planning, which
primarily involved information technology specialists reporting to senior
management and the board, business resumption contingency planning also
required involvement by business personnel outside of information
technology. 98
Every bank and thrift had to develop and implement an effective
written contingency plan designed to accomplish a minimum of three
objectives. The plan had to identify and describe the types of scenarios that
could be expected if mission-critical systems malfunctioned due to Year
2000 problems. It was required to evaluate possible responses and select a
reasonable contingency strategy for the vulnerable systems. Finally,
provisions had to be made to test contingency plans, including periodic
internal testing, as well as testing by an objective independent party such as
an auditor or consultant.99  Contingency plans were required to be
appropriate for the institution's technological systems and operating
structures.100 Federal regulators expected the board of directors and senior
management to put a high priority on contingency plans.'0 '
There were four phases in the business resumption contingency
planning process. All four phases had to be completed by June 30, 1999:02
Establishing Organizational Planning Guidelines: A key
part of developing a business resumption contingency plan
was identifying which core business processes might fail if
Year 2000 problems were not solved.0 3 During this phase,
9s See Questions and Answers, supra note 8.
99 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,485.
'0o See id. at 55,482.
"o See FFIEC, Guidance Concerning Contingency Planning in Connection with
Year 2000 Readiness (visited May 13, 1998) <http://www.ffiec.gov/y2k/
contplan.htm>.
102 See id; Questions and Answers, supra note 8.
103 A core business process was comprised of one or more mission-critical systems
and generally was defined along functional lines. For example, deposit-taking was a
core business process that depended on at least three-mission-critical systems (i.e.,
automated clearing house, proof and deposit systems). Specific mission-critical
systems could be components of a number of core business processes and could
2000]
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senior management had to designate an individual or
working group (possibly including disaster recovery
specialists and audit representatives) to develop and monitor
the contingency plan. The person or group was responsible
for identifying the high priority risks and the functions or
processes that needed to work in order for the institution to
remain viable. A time line had to be prepared that allowed
sufficient time for testing and activation of the contingency
plan, if necessary. Existing contingency plans were to be
reviewed to assess their continued effectiveness and
eliminate redundancy. A reporting process had to be
established to track progress on contingency planning.
Performing A Business Impact Analysis: During this phase,
each core business process had to be evaluated for Year
2000 readiness, the financial and marketing impact if that
process broke down (including the impact on the very
viability of the institution) and the effect of regulatory
requirements. This analysis had to consider factors such as
the types of risk that could affect core business processes,
the likelihood of their occurrence, the probable timing of an
occurrence (e.g., quarter end), the cost and duration of
operation failure, the impact of multiple system failures, etc.
Institutions also had to take into account whether they might
experience unusual funding needs in late 1999 and early
2000 arising from surges in deposit outflows or loan
demands. 1°4 Priority went to possible failures that would
have had the worst effect on the institution's core business
processes. Year 2000 failure scenarios had to be developed
to pinpoint the types and levels of business needs that had to
be met.
Developing A Business Resumption Contingency Plan:
Armed with the results of the business impact analysis, the
institution was required to investigate contingency options
serve as an interface between and among the operations of core business processes.
See Questions and Answers, supra note 8.
104 In such an event, normal liquidity sources had to be expanded and alternative
sources located. Institutions that had to rely on the Federal Reserve's discount
window due to lack of market funding sources were advised to file the appropriate
documents and pledge collateral as early as possible in 1999. Thrifts that were
members of the Federal Home Loan Bank System could also have requested
advances. See Questions and Answers, supra note 8.
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and select strategies that were cost-effective and most
reasonable, given the institution's size, complexity and type
of information systems used. The primary goal of the
contingency plan was to maximize the operating capability
and speed of recovery. The plan had to contain a recovery
plan for each core business process that would result in at
least a minimum level of acceptable service. Consideration
had to be given to quick fixes, partial replacement or
reliance on other manual or automated processes. FFIEC
announced that branches could be temporarily closed due to
Year 2000 disruptions beyond an institution's control
without being subject to the normal branch closing
procedures in 12 U.S.C. § 1831r-l.' 5  As part of the
contingency plan, a crisis management team needed to be
designated and made responsible for implementing the plan
and responding promptly to reaction from customers and the
media. Management had to consider how to respond to
events outside of the institution's control that could
substantially affect customer confidence. All members of
the crisis management team were required to receive
appropriate training to carry out the contingency plan.
Realistic trigger dates for activating the plan had to be set.
Sufficient staff had to be on hand to handle any disruptions
between December 30, 1999 and January 3, 2000, as well as
on other key dates.
Copies of all key data and files had to be made, either in
hard copy or machine-readable form. Where an institution
relied on systems provided by third parties, it had to take
account of the outside vendors' contingency plans. Legal
counsel were advised to review data processing and other
vendor contracts where necessary to determine each party's
responsibility. Data processing insurance coverage had to be
reviewed and a public relations committee established to
ensure accurate public statements. The feasibility of the
contingency plan had to undergo an independent review by
qualified individuals, such as internal or external auditors or
employees who were not involved in formulating the plan.
105 Institutions, in consultation with counsel, were advised to consider any
applicable state law requirements regarding branch closings and the effect of other
obligations regarding provision of services to affected customers. See Questions
and Answers, supra note 8.
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Designing Validation Methods: The staff who were
responsible for the contingency plan were required to stay
abreast of the institution's progress under its overall Year
2000 plan and adjust the contingency plan accordingly to
reflect any changes. The contingency plan had to be
periodically tested through methods such as simulations, role
play, walk-throughs and alternate site reviews.
As part of a business resumption contingency plan, management was
responsible for considering how the institution might be vulnerable if outside
vendors failed to meet their contractual service obligations due to Year 2000
problems. Alternate service or software providers needed to be identified in
case vendors' attempts at Year 2000 compliant repairs or upgrades proved
inadequate. 10 6 Trigger dates for hiring those alternate providers had to be set
and put into effect where necessary. Management was required to consult
legal counsel about available legal remedies or strategies in such an event
and notify federal regulators of any such difficulties.0 7
Federal regulators expected contingency plan provisions on service
providers and software vendors to contain the following components:1
0 8
* A risk assessment that identified potential disruptions and
the effect those disruptions could have if a service provider
or software vendor was unable to achieve Year 2000
compliance. The risk assessment had to evaluate the
probability of such disruptions and devise controls to
minimize, eliminate or respond to that risk.
* Analysis of available strategies and resources to restore
system or business operations.
* A recovery program that identified the internal and external
personnel, processes and equipment that were necessary for
the institution to function at an adequate level. All of the
participants had to be aware of their roles and have adequate
training.
* A comprehensive schedule of each vendor's remediation
program, including trigger dates. Institutions were advised
to build in additional time for repairs if internal test results
failed.
106 See Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
107 See Institution Due Diligence, supra note 16.
108 See id.
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2. Remediation Contingency Plans
A second type of contingency plan, called a remediation contingency
plan, was required for institutions that had not successfully completed
repairs, testing and/or implementation, or that had fallen behind schedule in
accomplishing those tasks. A formal written remediation contingency plan
was not required for mission-critical systems or applications that had been
successfully remediated, tested and implemented. If an institution or any of
its service providers or outside software vendors were unable to complete
repairs, testing and implementation successfully within federal deadlines,
then a written remediation contingency plan was needed.'09
All such institutions were required to develop and implement an
effective written remediation contingency plan that satisfied a minimum of
two objectives. First, the plan had to outline the available alternatives if
repairs, testing and implementation did not succeed (such as resort to other
third party suppliers) and select a reasonable contingency strategy. Second,
the plan had to establish trigger dates for activating the plan, taking into
account the time that would be needed to switch to outside suppliers or to
complete any other chosen strategy." 0 Such contingency plans were key for
products and services provided by vendors that were mission-critical."'
Where payment of a fee was necessary to ensure that an alternative
service provider or vendor was available, whether to pay the fee was a
business decision that the board of directors and senior management were
required to make. In arriving at that decision, the board and management
had to consider the probability that Year 2000 readiness efforts might fail,
either on the part of the institution or existing service providers or software
vendors. Management and the board also had to take into account the extent
to which existing providers had met the institution's timetable, the amount of
time needed to switch to alternate providers, the availability of such
providers and their reputation among other institutions or user groups.' 12
109 See Questions and Answers, supra note 8.
110 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,485.
"'. See Year 2000 Business Risk, supra note 16.
112 See FFIEC, Guidance Concerning Contingency Planning in Connection with
Year 2000 Readiness (visited May 13, 1998) <http://www.ffiec.gov/y2k/
contplan.htm>.
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F. Implementation
During the implementation phase, banks and thrifts were required to
tackle several tasks. First and foremost was addressing systems that did not
pass testing. It was imperative that any mission-critical systems that were
still not compliant immediately be brought to the attention of top
management. For systems that failed testing, the business consequences had
to be assessed and the contingency plan for that system had to be put into
effect. For complex applications whose success was in doubt, it was
necessary to implement the contingency plan while continuing to work on a
solution. Where replacement systems could not be installed in time, existing
systems had to be repaired.13
During implementation, staff also had to be trained to operate
upgrades and any new systems. It was important to allocate sufficient time
for training.
1 4
Attention also had to be paid to computerization purchases down the
road. Management was required to verify that any new systems or
subsequent changes to compliant systems were Year 2000 compliant.15
G. Response To Customer Inquiries
As the Year 2000 approached, customers looked to banks and thrifts
for assurances that their institutions would not experience service disruptions
due to the century date change. In an effort to stem public panic and alarm,
federal regulators stressed the importance of devising "customer awareness
programs" designed to respond to questions and communicate with
customers about Year 2000 issues. Management and the board of directors
were ultimately responsible for making certain that customers received
satisfactory responses to their Year 2000 concerns. 
116
Many customers were concerned about the safety of the funds in
their accounts. News accounts advised depositors to withdraw cash,
prompting customers to ask whether they should withdraw cash and, if so,
how much. 17 The ability to access funds through ATMs, debit cards, phone
113 See Year 2000 Business Risk, supra note 16; Project Management Awareness,
supra note 12.
115 See Year 2000 Business Risk, supra note 16.
115 See Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
116 See Customer Awareness Programs, supra note 16.
117 In anticipation of stepped-up withdrawals, the Federal Reserve System ordered
enough new currency notes to boost printing of currency notes thirty-three percent.
See Susan Mclnerney, Fed, Treasury Bulk Up Cash Reserves to Meet Year 2000
Currency Demands, 71 BNA BANKING REP. 251 (1998).
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lines or the Internet was also of concern and institutions had to offer alternate
means of access if disruptions occurred.
Similarly, institutions were advised to expect questions about the
reliability of direct deposit, direct debit and other automatic electronic
payments. Institutions were instructed to explain how they would assist
customers if automatic transactions went haywire. Borrowers worried about
receiving proper credit for loan payments. Customers asked what types of
records they should maintain before and after January 1, 2000. They also
requested general information about the institution's record keeping practices
and the status of its Year 2000 efforts and contingency plans." 1
8
Institutions were expected to take the initiative to inform customers
such as depositors, borrowers, fiduciary clients and others who transacted
business with them about their Year 2000 readiness. Consideration had to be
given to notifying customers through brochures or inserts accompanying
monthly statements, toll-free hotlines, seminars or web site disclosures"19
Legal counsel were advised to review any disclosures in advance. 2 °
In addition, personnel who regularly interacted with customers had
to be trained to respond appropriately to inquiries by providing customers
with written information or referring them to expert staff. Institutions were
encouraged to disseminate news of their Year 2000 programs to news media
and community organizations.
121
In February 1999, FFIEC issued a guidance on the elements that
customer communications statements should address. 122 Because customers
could be confused about the nature of the Year 2000 problem, banks and
thrifts had to explain what the Year 2000 problem was. Regulators stressed
that customers should be informed "up-front that maintaining their
confidence in banking with the financial institution-now and after the Year
2000-was a top priority."'123 Customers were to be given assurances that
the institution would have contingency plans in place to ensure that
customers had access to their money and accurate account information in
118 See Customer Awareness Programs, supra note 16.
19 See id. The FDIC developed two publications that institutions distributed to
customers. The first was entitled "The Year 2000, Your Bank and You." In
addition, the FDIC developed a Year 2000 "statement stuffer" for inclusion with
monthly statements. See FDIC, Two New FDIC Publications for Consumers on the
Year 2000 Problem, FIL-137-98, 1998 FDIC Interp. Ltr. LEXIS 126 (Dec. 30,
1998).
120 See Customer Awareness Programs, supra note 16.
121 See id
122 See FFIEC, Year 2000 Customer Communication Outline (visited Feb. 17,
1999) <http://wwwffiec.gov/custcom.htm>.
123 See id
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case problems occurred. In addition, institutions were told to point out that
accounts were covered by $100,000 in federal deposit insurance. They were
similarly urged to describe the institution's progress toward its Year 2000
plan and emphasize the involvement of senior management as well as federal
and state regulators.124
When making disclosures, banks and thrifts had to be careful to
avoid public disclosures of information or summary ratings from Year 2000
examinations or reviews, whether that information related to the institution,
outside service providers or software vendors. 125 Banks and thrifts also had
to avoid any statements that might give the impression that regulators had
approved or certified their Year 2000 readiness.
1 26
Customer confidence was not simply a matter of public relations.
Banks and thrifts could have offered financial inducements to keep customer
accounts. For instance, banks could have considered offering free checking
for deposits over a certain level to encourage depositors not to withdraw
funds. Institutions could also have considered providing Year 2000
demonstrations to show customers how their accounts might be affected by
the Year 2000 date change.127
H. Obligations Of Management And The Board of Directors
Above all, federal banking regulators looked to an institution's board
of directors and management to ensure compliance with the Guidelines and
Year 2000 readiness. The Year 2000 Guidelines and guidances placed a
heavy onus on managers and directors and required active intervention and
monitoring by management and the board.
Under the Guidelines, management and the board could not turn over
Year 2000 compliance to a project manager and then sit back. During all
stages of repairs, testing and contingency planning, management and the
board had to actively oversee planning, resource allocation, and the
institution's progress toward Year 2000 readiness' 28 Together, both bodies
were expected to allocate sufficient resources to successfully resolve any
Year 2000 problems. Senior management was expected to manage the Year
2000 project on a day-to-day basis. 29 If the institution was contemplating
124 See id.
125 See Customer Awareness Programs, supra note 16; Section V.A infra.
126 See Customer Awareness Programs, supra note 16.
127 See Year 2000: Computer Glitch Presents Opportunities, Risks for Banks and
Thrifts, Expert Says, 71 BNA BANKING REP. 681 (1998).
128 Thomas Vartanian developed a valuable checklist for board and management
oversight. See Thomas P. Vartanian, Year 2000 compliance checklist, BUS. L.
TODAY 45 (Sept./Oct. 1998).
129 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,485.
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any strategic business transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions, major
systems development, corporate alliances or system interdependencies,
management and the board had to evaluate the Year 2000 risk associated
with those transactions.130  The first issue was whether the institution's
internal audit function and internal controls were up to the task of keeping
tab on progress toward Year 2000 compliance.
Management also had to ensure that sufficient internal controls were
in place to make certain that the institution stayed on schedule with Year
2000 remediation.' 3 1 As part of its oversight responsibilities, every
institution's board of directors had to require management to provide it with
written status reports on Year 2000 readiness. Management had to furnish
those reports to the board at least quarterly and keep the board otherwise
informed of the progress toward Year 2000 compliance. The status reports
had to discuss the institution's overall progress in attaining readiness and
progress to date compared with the projected completion dates in the
institution's Year 2000 plan. Status reports also had to discuss progress or
lack thereof by key outside vendors in providing Year 2000 compliant
services, as well as progress by other material third parties (such as
correspondent banks and check clearing houses) in achieving Year 2000
readiness. Material customers who were not effectively addressing their own
Year 2000 problems had to be brought to the board's attention at least
quarterly and actions to control such risks had to be discussed. Special
attention also had to be paid to internal and external testing results, the status
of contingency planning and the status of customer risk assessments.'
32
If the Year 2000 project failed to meet critical benchmarks, the board
was to be notified immediately. 33  Because examiners inspected board
minutes for evidence of active oversight by the board, the minutes needed to
reflect all material actions by the board to address Year 2000 issues or
concerns.1
34
IV. BROADER BUSINESS ISSUES
Federal banking regulators conditioned the approval of applications
for branching, mergers and acquisitions, etc., on satisfactory progress toward
130 See id.; Section I1I.B infra.
131 See Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
132 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,485; Year 2000 Impact on
Customers, supra note 16; Year 2000 Business Risk, supra note 16.
133 See Year 2000 Business Risk, supra note 16.
134 See Year 2000 Business Risk, supra note 1; Project Management Awareness,
supra note 12.
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Year 2000 readiness. The Year 2000 problem also posed important
accounting and financial disclosure issues, both under generally accepted
accounting principles and the federal securities laws.
The Year 2000 problem was not solely an issue of technology or
repairs. As federal regulators repeatedly stressed, the Year 2000 problem
had consequences for everything from loan underwriting and strategic
business alliances to financial disclosures and bottom-line profitability.
Management needed to take account of these broader ramifications of the
Year 2000 problem.
135
A. Mergers, Acquisitions And Other Regulatory Applications
Integrating computer systems during mergers or acquisitions is
complex and fraught with problems during the best of times, and these
problems intensified with the added pressure of Year 2000 readiness. 36 As
already discussed, federal regulators expected every institution, during its
Year 2000 assessment process, to consider the potential effects that mergers
and acquisitions, major system development, corporate alliances and system
interdependencies could have had on the Year 2000 readiness of affected
computer systems, both for existing systems and any that were acquired.
37
In addition, regulators conditioned the approval of applications (whether
those applications were limited to branching or sought approval of mergers
or acquisitions) to successful handling of the century date change.138
In 1998, the Comptroller of the Currency issued an advisory letter in
which he announced that OCC approval of corporate applications (including
applications for charters, conversions, business combinations, branching and
establishment of operating subsidiaries that would rely heavily on
technology) would depend on Year 2000 preparedness and the ability to
integrate hardware and software systems resulting from any proposed
135 See Year 2000 Business Risk, supra note 16.
136 See generally Brette S. Simon, Addressing Y2K issues in M&A deals: A Lesson
in Representations, Warranties, and Indemnities, BUS. L. TODAY 42 (Sept./Oct.
1998).
137 See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,485; Project Management
Awareness, supra note 12.
138 See generally Charlotte D. Roederer, Conducting Due Diligence: Special Issues
Raised in Banking Acquisitions, in Conducting Due Diligence 1998 (PLI Corporate
Law & Prac. Course Handbook Series, Order No. B4-7227 1998) for an excellent
overview of the Year 2000 issues inherent in corporate applications to federal
banking regulators.
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combination.'39 In that regard, the OCC specifically looked for compliance
with the Year 2000 deadlines set by regulators and the safety and soundness
guidelines and guidances on the Year 2000 problem. Where Year 2000
deficiencies became apparent upon review, expedited processing could be
denied. Additionally, the OCC could condition approval on remedial actions
or deny applications altogether. 4°
Similarly, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors required
applicants for mergers or acquisitions to show that the transactions would not
impede Year 2000 readiness.' 41 Banking organizations with less-than-
satisfactory Year 2000 ratings did not qualify for expedited processing and
were instructed to advise Federal Reserve officers before deciding to embark
on any activity requiring federal approval, including acquisitions or
expansion. 142 Applicants were expected to demonstrate Year 2000 readiness,
as well as sufficient financial and managerial resources to ensure compliance
throughout the combined or expanded organization. The Federal Reserve
looked with disfavor on any proposed expansion that diverted resources
needed to ensure Year 2000 readiness. In order for applicants with less-than-
satisfactory Year 2000 ratings to obtain approval by the Fed, the Fed had to
conclude that the applicant's Year 2000 rating could be upgraded to
satisfactory or that the proposal would have no material bearing on the
applicant's ability to meet its Year 2000 responsibilities, e.g., due to the
limited nature of the proposal. The Fed announced in that regard that
banks that were too far behind in Year 2000 readiness could not expect to
remedy the problem by putting themselves up for sale. According to the Fed,
139 See OCC, Year 2000 and System Integration Considerations in Corporate
Application Decisions, Advisory Letter 98-1 (Jan. 20, 1998), available 1998 OCC
CB LEXIS 7.
140 See id.
141 See Federal Reserve Board, The Federal Reserve's Intensified Year 2000
Compliance Efforts, Federal Reserve Board SR Letter 98-3 (SUP) (visited Mar. 4,
1998) <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1998/sr9803.htm>.
142 See Federal Reserve Board, Phase III of the Federal Reserve's Year 2000
Supervision Program and Guidance Concerning Follow-up Enforcement Actions and
Applications, SR Letter 99-2 (SUP) 7 (visited Jan. 29, 1999)
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1999/sr9902.htm>; Federal
Reserve Board, The Federal Reserve's Intensified Year 2000 Compliance Efforts,
SR Letter 98-3 (SUP) (visited Mar. 4, 1998)
<http://www.fedralreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1999/sr9902.htm> [hereinafter SR
Letter 98-3].
143 See SR Letter 98-3, supra note 142.
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that approach "[was] a high risk, unacceptable plan of action" that the Fed
refused to countenance.
144
In late 1998, the Federal Reserve Board proposed amending
Regulation CC to lengthen the normal one-year transition period for merged
banks to integrate their computer systems. The proposal applied to banks
that consummated mergers between July 1, 1998 and June 1, 1999. Under
the proposal, the Fed treated those banks as separate banks until June 1,
2000, whereupon the one-year transition period would begin to run. The
purpose of the proposed amendment was to allow bank mergers to proceed
without concern that mandatory system integration would divert resources
that were better put to use toward Year 2000 readiness.
B. Financial Reporting And Disclosure
The Year 2000 problem had major financial and reporting
consequences that needed to be addressed by management. From the
perspective of safety and soundness, federal banking regulators expected
management to assess the effect of Year 2000 repairs on an ongoing basis on
earnings, capital and liquidity. 146 Parallel obligations appeared in the new
federal securities disclosure requirements for publicly held banking
organizations.
In 1998, publicly traded companies became subject to new
disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws on Year 2000
compliance. On July 29, 1998, the Securities and Exchange Commission
issued a key interpretive release that addressed this issue. 47 Federal banking
regulators incorporated the SEC's interpretation by reference and applied
144 See id.
145 See Federal Reserve Rulemaking Release, Regulation CC, Docket No. R-1027
(Dec. 23, 1998); Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 63 Fed. Reg.
66,499 (1998).
146 See Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
147 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Interpretation: Disclosure of Year
2000 Issues and Consequences by Public Companies, Investment Advisers,
Investment Companies, and Municipal Securities Issuers (Aug. 4, 1998) (codified in
relevant part at 17 C.F.R. pt. 231) [hereinafter SEC Interpretation]. The
interpretation also applied to Year 2000 disclosures required of investment advisers,
investment companies and issuers of municipal securities. See also Report to Be
Made By Certain Brokers and Dealers, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,208 (1998) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240) for SEC reporting obligations of broker-dealers on their Year 2000
preparedness. See generally James R. Doty, The SEC talks about Y2K, BUS. L.
TODAY 46 (Nov./Dec. 1998).
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those requirements to publicly traded banks and bank holding companies.'
48
In addition, the FDIC recommended that other institutions make disclosures
on Year 2000 readiness either in the annual disclosure statements required of
FDIC-insured institutions under 12 C.F.R. pt. 350, in their annual reports to
shareholders or, where applicable, in the annual reports required of
institutions with a half-billion dollars or more in assets under 12 C.F.R. pt.
363.149
Under the SEC's interpretation, a publicly held company had to
provide Year 2000 disclosures if (1) its assessment of its Year 2000 issues
was not complete, or (2) management determined that the consequences of
its Year 2000 issues would have a material effect on the company's business,
results of operations, or financial condition, without taking into account the
company's efforts to avoid those consequences.' 50 Under the first prong, the
company had to verify the Year 2000 readiness of any third party who could
have a material impact on the company. Relevant third parties included
vendors and suppliers who could have a material effect on the company's
business if they did not achieve compliance; customers whose lack of Year
2000 readiness could cause a material loss of business; and other third parties
to whom the business might be legally liable for any Year 2000 business
disruptions.'1
5
Under the second, alternative prong of the test for disclosure, the
SEC advised that companies should normally assume that they and their
material third-party suppliers and customers were not Year 2000 compliant
for purposes of securities disclosures (absent clear proof to the contrary) and
should therefore make disclosures weighing the likely results of that lack of
preparedness. The balancing test was to be conducted by calculating the
consequences if the company was not prepared, rather than the amount of
money the company planned to spend to address Year 2000 issues.
Uncertainties relating to remediation, business relationships with third
parties, business interruptions, litigation, insurance and other contingencies
had to be taken into account. 52 Where a company substantially completed
148 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FIL-1 11-98, 1998 FDIC Interp.
Ltr. LEXIS 97 (Oct. 8, 1998); OCC Advisory Letter AL 98-12, 1998 OCC CB
LEXIS 89 (Aug. 26, 1998) (national banks). See also OCC Advisory Letter AL 98-
2, 1998 OCC CB LEXIS 25 (Feb. 11, 1998).
149 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FIL-I 11-98, 1998 FDIC Interp.
Ltr. LEXIS 97 (Oct. 8, 1998).
"So See SEC Interpretation, supra note 147.
151 See id.
152 See id. In determining whether potential Year 2000 consequences were
material, the company could have excluded any quantifiable dollar amounts whose
risks were covered by Year-2000-specific insurance policies. See id.
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its testing and assessment of third party issues, obtained written
representations of preparedness by all material third parties and thus had a
reasonable basis to assume that it was Year 2000 ready, it was not obliged to
make disclosures under prong two. Nonetheless, the SEC advised disclosure
in any case.
153
The SEC expected that "for the vast majority of company Year 2000
issues [were] likely to be material and therefore disclosure [was]
required."' 5 4 Furthermore, because new Year 2000 issues almost always
cropped up as a company worked through remediation, the SEC expected
companies to update their Year 2000 disclosures in each of their quarterly
and annual reports."'
Where a bank, bank holding company or nonbank affiliate had a
Year 2000 disclosure obligation, the SEC expected the company to make
disclosures on the following topics in the Management Discussion and
Analysis ("MD&A") sections of their quarterly (10Q) and annual (10K)
reports: 1
56
The Company's State Of Readiness: The company was
required to describe its Year 2000 issues in sufficient detail
so that investors could understand the challenges that the
company faced. The discussion was to address both
information technology systems and environmental systems,
such as elevators and vaults, that had embedded technology
such as microcontrollers. The company was required to
describe its progress to date in each of the phases of
remediation (awareness, assessment, repairs, testing,
implementation and contingency planning) and whether the
company was on schedule. On the topic of testing, serious
consideration was to be given to disclosing what kinds and
percentage of the company's hardware, software and
embedded systems had been tested and validated as Year
2000 ready and what testing and verification methodologies
were used. The Year 2000 issues raised by the company's
material business relationships with outsiders also needed to
be disclosed. The OCC took the position that any informal
153 See id.
154 Id.
155 See id.
156 See id.
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and formal enforcement actions regarding Year 2000 issues
against the company also triggered disclosure to the SEC.
157
* The Costs Of Addressing The Company's Year 2000 Issues:
The SEC expected the material historical and estimated costs
of remediation to be disclosed. The cost of replacing non-
compliant systems had to be disclosed except in unusual
cases where the company would have replaced the systems
anyhow and did not accelerate replacement due to Year 2000
issues.
158
* The Risks Presented By The Company's Year 2000 Issues:
Companies were required to include a reasonable description
of their most reasonably likely worst case Year 2000
scenario. Unless the company was certain that this scenario
would not be likely to have a material effect on the
company's results of operations, liquidity and financial
condition, any uncertainty had to be disclosed, as well as
efforts to analyze and handle this uncertainty.
* The Company's Contingency Plans: Companies were
required to describe how they would handle the most likely
worst case scenarios. They had to describe their
contingency plans or their progress toward adopting
contingency plans, if none yet existed.
Companies also had to disclose any other material matters that circumstances
dictated. 5 9
Companies were instructed to consider the proper accounting and
auditing treatment of Year 2000 issues when preparing their financial
statements. Special attention needed to be given to the treatment of Year-
2000 related payment commitments, acceleration of loans due to Year-2000
'57 See Michael Bologna, OCC Taking Steps Against Banks For Y2K Unreadiness,
O7lcial Says, 70 BNA BANKING REP. 796, 797 (1998).The SEC also urged disclosure of other matters relating to costs, including: all
Year-2000 related costs, even if those costs were not material; how much of total
estimate Year 2000 project costs had already been incurred at the end of each
reporting period; the source of funds for Year 2000 costs, including the percentage
of the information technology used for remediation; whether other information
technology projects had been deferred due to Year 2000 efforts and the effects of
this delay on financial condition and results of operations; any independent
verification and validation process used to assure the reliability of risk and cost
estimates, particularly during testing; a chart tracking the company's Year 2000
progress over time; and a breakdown of the costs incurred to achieve Year 2000
readiness. See SEC Interpretation, supra note 147.
159 See id.
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related defaults, loan loss provisions and revenue and loss recognition. 160 It
was important not to ignore the fact that Year 2000 repairs or new systems
could inadvertently introduce changes that affected or impaired an
institution's accounting system and/or internal controls'
61
In the interpretive release, the SEC took the position that the
statutory safe harbors for forward-looking information under the 1933 and
1934 Acts 162 applied to numerous MD&A disclosures on Year 2000
readiness. MD&A projections of future costs were forward-looking
statements, as were descriptions of contingency plans, statements of
readiness based on third-party representations, anticipated Year 2000
problems and future timetables. However, statements of historical fact, such
as descriptions of past efforts at Year 2000 readiness (or lack thereof), did
not merit protection. 63 In addition, for the statutory safe harbors to apply,
material forward-looking statements had to be accompanied by "meaningful
cautionary statements," none of which could be boilerplate or knowingly
false when made.164
It is important to note that the statutory safe harbors did not apply to
initial public offerings or to investment companies. The same was true for
statements included in financial statements prepared in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles.165  Thus, statements of estimated
costs that were included in MD&A disclosures outside of the financial
statements were immune from suit, but inclusion of those costs in the
financial statements themselves or discussion of those costs in footnotes to
the financial statements were not protected.
166
V. AGENCY SUPERVISION AND ENFORCEMENT
Beginning in 1997, federal banking regulators examined insured
banks and thrifts for their progress toward Year 2000 readiness. Where
institutions' compliance ratings were less than satisfactory, agencies pursued
formal enforcement actions, including cease-and-desist orders and civil
money penalties, in order to avoid systemic problems due to Year 2000
malfunctions.
16o See id. See generally American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, The
Year 2000 Issue: Current Accounting and Auditing Guidance (1998) for a discussion
of the accounting and auditing treatment of Year 2000-related issues.
161 See Year 2000 Business Risk, supra, note 16.
162 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5.
163 See SEC Interpretation, supra note 147.
164 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i), 78u-5(c)(l)(A)(i).
165 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(b), 78u-5(b).
166 See SEC Interpretation, supra note 147.
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The banking industry's success in achieving Year 2000 readiness can
partly be attributed to the fact that federal regulators made it clear beginning
in 1997 that they would take vigorous enforcement against institutions that
failed to take appropriate steps toward Year 2000 compliance. Regulators
made good on their word.
A. Examinations
In 1998, federal banking regulators undertook Phase I of their special
on-site examinations for Year 2000 readiness. That first round, which was
completed on June 30, 1998, sought to evaluate the awareness and
assessment activities of all insured banks and thrifts. 67 As of year-end 1998,
approximately three percent of banks examined had received less-than-
satisfactory ratings.
168
Phase II of the Year 2000 examinations was scheduled to be
completed on March 31, 1999. The purpose of the second-round
examinations was considerably more searching and was intended to verify
that mission-critical systems had been repaired or upgraded and tested and
that contingency plans were in place. Highest priority was given to the large
financial institutions that present the greatest degree of national or regional
systemic risk, as well as to institutions that had previously been identified as
less than satisfactory and the largest service providers and software
vendors.
169
Phase III of the Year 2000 examinations commenced immediately
after completion of Phase II. In Phase III, federal examiners reviewed the
efforts of depository institutions and their outside suppliers to comply with
federal guidelines and deadlines for testing, implementation and contingency
planning. Once again, priority was given to the largest institutions with
167 See, e.g., Federal Reserve Board, The Federal Reserve's Intensified Year 2000
Compliance Efforts, SR Letter 98-3 (SUP) (Mar. 4, 1998). For descriptions of
examination questionnaires and Year 2000 examination procedures, see FFIEC, Year
2000 Phase II Work program (1998); Project Management Awareness, supra note
12. The OCC issued a compact disc entitled A Year 2000: OCC's Supervisory
Approach with information on the agency's Year 2000 policies and examination
procedures. See also OCC, Year 2000 Environmental Systems Examination
Procedures (Jan. 1999).
168 See Brett Chase, Mellon Works with Vendors, Customers in Run-Up to 2000,
AM. BANKER 5 (Feb. 3, 1999); Letter from Comptroller of the Currency John D.
Hawke, Jr., to Chief Executive Officers of National Banks, at 1 (Feb. 17, 1999).
169 See Regulators Release 'Phase II' of Their Year 2000 Supervisory Program,
BANKING POLICY REP. 5 (AUG. 3, 1998).
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assets over $1 billion, suppliers who presented the greatest degree of risk,
and institutions and suppliers previously ranked as less than satisfactory, "o
During the first round of examinations, the Federal Reserve Board
unveiled its supervisory rating system for Year 2000 compliance' 7 ' Other
federal banking regulators adopted the Fed's ranking system as a matter of
practice. Under that system, an institution could receive one of three ratings:
satisfactory, needs improvement or unsatisfactory. Anything less than a
satisfactory rating could cause the institution's overall safety and soundness
rating to fall or subject the institution to intensified scrutiny by regulators
72
A "satisfactory" rating was warranted when project weaknesses were
minor in nature and could readily be corrected within the existing project
framework. To issue a "satisfactory" rating, examiners looked for
assurances that senior management and the board understood the Year 2000
risk, were active in overseeing institutional corrective efforts, and devoted
sufficient resources to solving the problem. 73
A "needs improvement" rating meant that the institution showed less
than satisfactory performance in any of the key phases of the Year 2000
project management process. Failure to adhere to Year 2000 time lines
would result in a "needs improvement" rating. The same was true where
senior management or directors were not fully apprised of Year 2000
corrective efforts, had not committed sufficient financial or human resources
to address the risk, or did not fully understand Year 2000 implications.
Examiners specifically scrutinized whether any key elements in the Year
2000 Guidelines or the FFIEC guidances had not been addressed. A poor
response to potential Year 2000 problems of vendors could also lead to a
"needs improvement" rating. 174
An "unsatisfactory" rating showed critical deficiencies and poor
performance in any of the key phases of the Year 2000 program. In
unsatisfactory institutions, project weaknesses were serious and were not
easily corrected within the existing project management plan. The
institution's progress was seriously behind schedule. Senior management
and the board underestimated the potential impact that the Year 2000
170 See Federal Reserve Board, Phase III of the Federal Reserve's Year 2000
Supervision Program and Guidance Concerning Follow-up Enforcement Actions and
Applications, SR Letter 99-2 (SUP) (Jan. 29, 1999).
17 See Federal Reserve Board, The Federal Reserve's Intensified Year 2000
Compliance Efforts, SR Letter 98-3 (SUP) (Mar. 4, 1998).
172 See id
173 See id.
174 See id.
[Vol. 19: 153
2000] TECHNOLOGY SHIFTS AND THE LAW: YEAR 2000 READINESS 197
problem could have on their institution, had limited commitment to fixing
the problem and failed to exercise oversight.
An "unsatisfactory" rating was warranted where due diligence as to
outside suppliers was seriously flawed or where the institution had not
addressed the credit risks associated with the Year 2000 problem with
respect to large borrowers or bond issuers.
17 1
A variety of lapses could result in less-than-satisfactory ratings on
Year 2000 examinations. Prime among them were inadequate contingency
plans (particularly with respect to vendors), failure to complete assessment,
inadequate project plans, insufficient audit coverage of the institution's Year
2000 progress, insufficient vendor evaluations and failure to evaluate the
Year 2000 readiness of major customers.' 
7 6
Insured institutions were not the only entities that were subject to
federal Year 2000 examinations. Under existing statutory authority, the
FDIC, OCC and Federal Reserve Board had power to examine outside
service providers and software vendors for banks for Year 2000 readiness.
In 1998, President Clinton signed into law the Examination Parity and Year
2000 Readiness for Financial Institutions Act,177 which granted identical
examination and enforcement powers to the Office of Thrift Supervision and
the National Credit Union Administration.1
78
The federal bank regulatory agencies insisted that Year 2000
examination reports and results from those reports remain confidential and
not be disclosed to the general public.179 The fear was that otherwise, banks
with satisfactory ratings would tout those ratings to the public as proof of
their Year 2000 readiness, when that might not have been the case. This
injunction applied to all Year 2000 examination reports, whether those
examinations were of depository institutions, service providers or software
vendors. Financial institutions, service providers and software vendors were
also specifically forbidden from stating or implying that their Year 2000
plans or readiness had been approved or certified by regulators i.8
B. Enforcement
As early as May 1997, federal banking regulators announced that
they would take enforcement action against institutions that persistently
175 See id.
176 See Year 2000: OCC Y2K Review of National Banks Shows Most Institutions
Addressing Problem, 70 BNA BANKING REP. 926 (1998).
177 Pub. L. No. 105-164, 112 Stat. 32 (1998).
178 Id. § 3.
179 See, e.g., Confidentiality of Year 2000 Assessment Rating, FIL-74-98, 1998
FDIC Interp. Ltr. LEXIS 68 (July 8, 1998).
180 See Questions and Answers, supra, note 8.
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failed to pay adequate attention to Year 2000 compliance.18' Enforcement
measures could range from deficiency letters at a minimum to civil money
penalties or worse.
The OCC announced in early 1999 that for banks with less-than-
satisfactory ratings, the agency would henceforth rely primarily on the
deficiency letter process and less on supervisory directives and other
informal enforcement. 8 2  A deficiency letter listed specific potential
problems that a bank or thrift needed to address. 8 3 Banking organizations
with less-than-satisfactory progress could also have been placed on
intensified monthly monitoring which required them to submit monthly
progress reports to their primary federal banking regulator. Institutions could
have also received lower examination ratings for risk management or overall
management or conditions because of Year 2000 deficiencies.
84
Authority for deficiency letters was found in the safety and
soundness standard provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1. Under that
provision, federal banking regulators were authorized to issue deficiency
letters requiring institutions that failed to comply with the Year 2000
Guidelines to submit an acceptable compliance plan within thirty days of a
request. 185 If such a plan was not submitted on time or turned out to be
unacceptable, the agency had to issue an order directing the institution to
correct the deficiency. 86 Such orders were enforceable in federal district
court, with no need for prior agency adjudication' 8 7 Violation of such orders
provided the basis for assessing civil money penalties against institutions and
institution-affiliated parties, including officers and directors! 8 The Federal
Reserve Board announced that any banking organization within its
jurisdiction that had not submitted an acceptable corrective plan within thirty
181 See Project Management Awareness, supra note 12.
182 See OCC, Report to Congress on Year 2000 Activities, Fourth Quarter 1998, at
7-8.
183 See, e.g., Federal Reserve Board, The Federal Reserve's Intensified Year 2000
Compliance Efforts, SR Letter 98-3 (SUP) (Mar. 4, 1998).
'84 See id.
'8' 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-l(e)(1). See generally Patricia A. McCoy, Banking Law
Manual § 6.02 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing agency enforcement under Section 1831 p-
1(e)).
ms6 12 U.S.C. § 183 lp-l(e)(2); 12 C.F.R. pt. 30 app. A, pt. 208 app. D, pt. 364 app.
A, pt. 570 app. A.
187 Id. § 1818(i); 12 C.F.R. § 30.6, 263.305, 308.305, 570.5.
188 Id. § 1818(i)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 30.6, 263.305, 308.305, 570.5.
[Vol. 19: 153
TECHNOLOGY SHIFTS AND THE LAW: YEAR 2000 READINESS
days of receiving a Year 2000 deficiency letter faced immediate formal
enforcement.1
89
Receipt of a deficiency letter did not preclude formal enforcement
action, such as a cease-and-desist order, a removal or prohibition order, or a
civil money penalty.' 90 The agencies reserved the right to take any other
enforcement measures that were appropriate to insure Year 2000
readiness. 19' Institutions that planned to apply to federal regulators for
expansion through branch openings or mergers and acquisitions were warned
that they would be turned down unless they had made satisfactory progress
toward the century date change. 92 At an extreme, regulators had the power
to close non-compliant institutions.
Not satisfied with the deficiency letter process alone, the Federal
Reserve Board raised the heat when it announced that in 1999, any banking
organization rated less than satisfactory "for serious violations of the
FFIEC's Year 2000 compliance standards [would] be subject to public
formal enforcement actions.' 93 The Board was particularly concerned that
noncompliance at such a late date "could with some certainty affect the
organization's readiness for the millennium rollover.'4 94  In less serious
cases, where institutions received "needs improvement" ratings for
infractions that were less than significant, the Fed pursued informal
enforcement in the form of a memorandum of understanding or board
resolution. 95
Cease-and-desist orders were the most common type of formal
enforcement action. To add urgency to the need for Year 2000 readiness,
federal banking regulators began imposing cease-and-desist orders (normally
on a consent basis) in late 1997 for Year 2000 violations with increasing
regularity. 196 Cease-and-desist orders were issued against banks and bank
189 See Federal Reserve Board, The Federal Reserve's Intensified Year 2000
Compliance Efforts, SR Letter 98-3 (SUP) (Mar. 4, 1998).
190 See id. See generally Charles L. O'Brien, Civil Money Penalties for Failure to
Meet Year 2000 Objectives, 71 BNA BANKING REP. 384 (1998).
'9' See Interagency Guidelines, supra note 17, at 55,482, 55,484; 12 U.S.C. §§
183 lp-l(e)(2), (e)(3); 12 C.F.R. §§ 30.4(d), 263.303(d), 308.303(d), 570.3(d).
192 See Federal Reserve Board, The Federal Reserve's Intensified Year 2000
Compliance Efforts, SR Letter 98-3 (SUP) (Mar. 4, 1998).
193 Federal Reserve Board, Phase III of the Federal Reserve's Year 2000
Supervision Program and Guidance Concerning Follow-up Enforcement Actions and
A plications, SR Letter 99-2 (SUP) 5 (Jan. 29, 1999).
Id.
195 See id
196 See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Announcement
H2, 1999 No. 5 (Jan. 30, 1999) (written agreement with First Utah Bank in Salt Lake
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holding companies for apparent failures to complete a Year 2000 plan or
initiate repairs,' 97 inadequate Year 2000 project plans or resources,'98 failures
to test renovated systems by federal deadlines,' 99 failures to designate a
senior manager responsible for overseeing Year 2000 readiness, 200 failures to
evaluate large borrowers' Year 2000 compliance efforts,' and inadequate
City, Utah, to help ensure Year 2000 readiness) (discussed in Fed, Utah Bank Agree
on Year 2000 Guidelines, BNA BANKING REP. 349 (Feb. 22, 1999)).
197 See Federal Reserve Board Order, Adairsville Bancshares, Inc., Adairsville,
Georgia; the Bank of Adairsville, Adairsville, Georgia, Docket Nos. 98-031-
WA/RB-HC, 98-03 I-WA/RB-SM (Dec. 22, 1998); Federal Reserve Board Order,
Zia New Mexico Bank Tucumcari, New Mexico, No. 98-034-B-SM (Dec. 14,
1998); Agreement by and between Gold Country National Bank Brownsville,
California and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC EA No. 98-54,
1998 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 60 (Sept. 29, 1998); In re First Alliance Bank & Trust
Company Manchester, New Hampshire, FDIC-98-066b, 1998 FDIC Enf. Dec.
LEXIS 25 (Sept. 28, 1998); In re Pan American Bank Chicago, Illinois, FDIC-98-
53b, 1998 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 24 (Sept. 22, 1998); Formal Agreement Year
2000 Agreement by and between American Independent Bank, N.A. Gardena,
California and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC EA No. 98-40,
1998 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 46 (July 28, 1998); Agreement by and between First
National Bank Mount Pulaski, Illinois and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, OCC EA No. 98-42, 1998 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 48 (July 1, 1998); In re
Bankers Trust of Madison Madison, Alabama, FDIC-98-052b, 1998 FDIC Enf.
Dec. LEXIS 49 (June 12, 1998); Agreement by and between Heartland National
Bank Herrin, Illinois and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC EA
No. 98-31, 1998 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 37 (June 3,1998); In re Clovis Community
Bank Clovis, California, FDIC-98-22b, 1998 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 22 (Apr. 8,
1998); Federal Reserve Board, In re Putnam-Greene Financial Corporation Eatonton,
Georgia, No. 97-027-B-BHC (Nov. 17, 1997).
198 See Formal Agreement by and between the Community National Bank Franklin,
Ohio and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC EA No. 98-60, 1998
OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 65 (Sept. 30, 1998); In re Industrial Bank, N.A., OCC EA
No. 98-43, 1998 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 49 (Aug. 25, 1998).
199 See Federal Reserve Board Order, Frontier Bank of Laramie County Cheyenne,
Wyoming, Docket No. 98-030-B-SM (Nov. 17, 1998).
200 See Federal Reserve Board Order, Adairsville Bancshares, Inc., Adairsville,
Georgia; the Bank of Adairsville, Adairsville, Georgia, Docket Nos. 98-031-
WA/RB-HC, 98-031-WA/RB-SM (Dec. 22, 1998); Federal Reserve Board Order,
Zia New Mexico Bank Tucumcari, New Mexico, Docket No. 98-034-B-SM (Dec.
14, 1998).
201 See Federal Reserve Board Order, Frontier Bank of Laramie County Cheyenne,
Wyoming, Docket No. 98-030-B-SM (Nov. 17, 1998).
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testing.20 2 Federal regulators also entered cease-and-desist orders against
data service providers to banks for lack of Year 2000 preparedness.20 3  In
addition, Year 2000 compliance clauses became routine in cease-and-desist
orders against institutions that were unsafe or unsound in other respects.
204
The Federal Reserve Board further advised Federal Reserve Banks to issue
temporary cease-and-desist orders whenever "necessary to immediately
remedy severe Year 2000 deficiencies."2°5
In early 1999, the Federal Reserve Board advised that civil money
penalties, removal or prohibition should be invoked against banking
organizations that were in "substantial noncompliance with a written
agreement or cease and desist order addressing Year 2000 problems.'
0 6
Any Reserve Bank that failed to institute such measures in cases involving
202 See Agreement by and between Yampa Valley National Bank Hayden, Colorado
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1998 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 87
(Nov. 30, 1998).
203 See In re Nova Financial Corporation, Atlanta, Georgia, OCC EA No. 98-33,
1998 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 40 (July 8, 1998).
204 See Federal Reserve Board Order, Adairsville Bancshares, Inc., Adairsville,
Georgia; the Bank of Adairsville, Adairsville, Georgia, Docket Nos. 98-031-
WA/RB-HC, 98-031-WA/RB-SM (Dec. 22, 1998); Agreement by and between
Yampa Valley National Bank Hayden, Colorado and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, 1998 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 87 (Nov. 30, 1998); Federal Reserve
Board Order, Frontier Bank of Laramie County Cheyenne, Wyoming, Docket No.
98-030-B-SM (Nov. 17, 1998); In re First Alliance Bank & Trust Company
Manchester, New Hampshire, FDIC-98-066b, 1998 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 25
(Sept. 28, 1998); In re Pan American Bank Chicago, Illinois, FDIC-98-53b, 1998
FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 24 (Sept. 22, 1998); In re Industrial Bank, N.A., OCC EA
No. 98-43, 1998 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 49 (Aug. 25, 1998); In re First Bank of
Childersburg, Vincent, Alabama, FDIC-98-076b, 1998 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 30
(Aug. 10, 1998); Agreement by and between First National Bank Mount Pulaski,
Illinois and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC EA No. 98-42,
1998 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 48 (July 1, 1998); In re Bankers Trust of Madison
Madison, Alabama, FDIC-98-052b, 1998 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 49 (June 12,
1998); Agreement by and between Heartland National Bank Herrin, Illinois and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC EA No. 98-31, 1998 OCC Enf.
Dec. LEXIS 37 (June 3, 1998); In re First Bank of Jacksonville Jacksonville,
Florida, FDIC-96-155b, 1998 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 94 (May 26, 1998); In re
Clovis Community Bank Clovis, California, FDIC-98-22b, 1998 FDIC Enf. Dec.
LEXIS 22 (Apr. 8, 1998).
205 Federal Reserve Board, Phase III of the Federal Reserve's Year 2000
Supervision Program and Guidance Concerning Follow-up Enforcement Actions
and Applications, SR Letter 99-2 (SUP) 6 (Jan. 29, 1999).
206 id.
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substantial noncompliance had to provide written justification to the Director
of the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation. °7
VI. EPILOGUE
This chronicle ends in the spring of 1999, when federal Year 2000
enforcement efforts were at their height and institutions were in the throes of
Year 2000 testing. In the final analysis, the story ended happily, but its
meaning was unclear. On January 1, 2000 and during the weeks thereafter,
virtually no Year 2000 problems of any significance were reported at United
States banks and regulators and the public breathed a collective sigh of relief.
Other industries outside of the financial services industry achieved identical
success, however, through voluntary compliance. Thus, it is premature to
say whether the costly system of command-and-control regulation in the
banking industry was a resounding success or simply regulatory overkill.
The Year 2000 episode and the different enforcement regimes that ensued
deserve further study as a valuable laboratory for diverse regulatory
approaches to a common problem.
207 See id
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